Total
7748 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-42271 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-19 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix use after free in iucv_sock_close() iucv_sever_path() is called from process context and from bh context. iucv->path is used as indicator whether somebody else is taking care of severing the path (or it is already removed / never existed). This needs to be done with atomic compare and swap, otherwise there is a small window where iucv_sock_close() will try to work with a path that has already been severed and freed by iucv_callback_connrej() called by iucv_tasklet_fn(). Example: [452744.123844] Call Trace: [452744.123845] ([<0000001e87f03880>] 0x1e87f03880) [452744.123966] [<00000000d593001e>] iucv_path_sever+0x96/0x138 [452744.124330] [<000003ff801ddbca>] iucv_sever_path+0xc2/0xd0 [af_iucv] [452744.124336] [<000003ff801e01b6>] iucv_sock_close+0xa6/0x310 [af_iucv] [452744.124341] [<000003ff801e08cc>] iucv_sock_release+0x3c/0xd0 [af_iucv] [452744.124345] [<00000000d574794e>] __sock_release+0x5e/0xe8 [452744.124815] [<00000000d5747a0c>] sock_close+0x34/0x48 [452744.124820] [<00000000d5421642>] __fput+0xba/0x268 [452744.124826] [<00000000d51b382c>] task_work_run+0xbc/0xf0 [452744.124832] [<00000000d5145710>] do_notify_resume+0x88/0x90 [452744.124841] [<00000000d5978096>] system_call+0xe2/0x2c8 [452744.125319] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [452744.125321] [<00000000d5930018>] iucv_path_sever+0x90/0x138 [452744.125324] [452744.125325] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Note that bh_lock_sock() is not serializing the tasklet context against process context, because the check for sock_owned_by_user() and corresponding handling is missing. Ideas for a future clean-up patch: A) Correct usage of bh_lock_sock() in tasklet context, as described in Re-enqueue, if needed. This may require adding return values to the tasklet functions and thus changes to all users of iucv. B) Change iucv tasklet into worker and use only lock_sock() in af_iucv. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42270 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-19 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: iptables: Fix null-ptr-deref in iptable_nat_table_init(). We had a report that iptables-restore sometimes triggered null-ptr-deref at boot time. [0] The problem is that iptable_nat_table_init() is exposed to user space before the kernel fully initialises netns. In the small race window, a user could call iptable_nat_table_init() that accesses net_generic(net, iptable_nat_net_id), which is available only after registering iptable_nat_net_ops. Let's call register_pernet_subsys() before xt_register_template(). [0]: bpfilter: Loaded bpfilter_umh pid 11702 Started bpfilter BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000013 PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 2 PID: 11879 Comm: iptables-restor Not tainted 6.1.92-99.174.amzn2023.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c6i.4xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017 RIP: 0010:iptable_nat_table_init (net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:87 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:121) iptable_nat Code: 10 4c 89 f6 48 89 ef e8 0b 19 bb ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 38 41 83 c7 01 49 83 c6 28 41 83 ff 04 75 dc 48 8b 44 24 08 48 8b 0c 24 <48> 89 08 4c 89 ef e8 a2 3b a2 cf 48 83 c4 10 44 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c RSP: 0018:ffffbef902843cd0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000013 RBX: ffff9f4b052caa20 RCX: ffff9f4b20988d80 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: ffffffffc04201c0 RBP: ffff9f4b29394000 R08: ffff9f4b07f77258 R09: ffff9f4b07f77240 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9f4b09635388 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff9f4b1a3c6c00 R14: ffff9f4b20988e20 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007f6284340000(0000) GS:ffff9f51fe280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000013 CR3: 00000001d10a6005 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? xt_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1259) ? __die_body.cold (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:420) ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:727) ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:40 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:75 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1470 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1518) ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:570) ? iptable_nat_table_init (net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:87 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:121) iptable_nat xt_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1259) xt_request_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1287) get_info (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:965) ? security_capable (security/security.c:809 (discriminator 13)) ? ns_capable (kernel/capability.c:376 kernel/capability.c:397) ? do_ipt_get_ctl (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1656) ? bpfilter_send_req (net/bpfilter/bpfilter_kern.c:52) bpfilter nf_getsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:116) ip_getsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1827) __sys_getsockopt (net/socket.c:2327) __x64_sys_getsockopt (net/socket.c:2342 net/socket.c:2339 net/socket.c:2339) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) RIP: 0033:0x7f62844685ee Code: 48 8b 0d 45 28 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 37 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 09 RSP: 002b:00007ffd1f83d638 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd1f83d680 RCX: 00007f62844685ee RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffd1f83d670 R09: 0000558798ffa2a0 R10: 00007ffd1f83d680 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd1f83e3b2 R13: 00007f6284 ---truncated--- | |||||
| CVE-2024-42283 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-19 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: nexthop: Initialize all fields in dumped nexthops struct nexthop_grp contains two reserved fields that are not initialized by nla_put_nh_group(), and carry garbage. This can be observed e.g. with strace (edited for clarity): # ip nexthop add id 1 dev lo # ip nexthop add id 101 group 1 # strace -e recvmsg ip nexthop get id 101 ... recvmsg(... [{nla_len=12, nla_type=NHA_GROUP}, [{id=1, weight=0, resvd1=0x69, resvd2=0x67}]] ...) = 52 The fields are reserved and therefore not currently used. But as they are, they leak kernel memory, and the fact they are not just zero complicates repurposing of the fields for new ends. Initialize the full structure. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42282 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-19 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mediatek: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference in dummy net_device handling Move the freeing of the dummy net_device from mtk_free_dev() to mtk_remove(). Previously, if alloc_netdev_dummy() failed in mtk_probe(), eth->dummy_dev would be NULL. The error path would then call mtk_free_dev(), which in turn called free_netdev() assuming dummy_dev was allocated (but it was not), potentially causing a NULL pointer dereference. By moving free_netdev() to mtk_remove(), we ensure it's only called when mtk_probe() has succeeded and dummy_dev is fully allocated. This addresses a potential NULL pointer dereference detected by Smatch[1]. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42284 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-19 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: Return non-zero value from tipc_udp_addr2str() on error tipc_udp_addr2str() should return non-zero value if the UDP media address is invalid. Otherwise, a buffer overflow access can occur in tipc_media_addr_printf(). Fix this by returning 1 on an invalid UDP media address. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42285 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-19 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/iwcm: Fix a use-after-free related to destroying CM IDs iw_conn_req_handler() associates a new struct rdma_id_private (conn_id) with an existing struct iw_cm_id (cm_id) as follows: conn_id->cm_id.iw = cm_id; cm_id->context = conn_id; cm_id->cm_handler = cma_iw_handler; rdma_destroy_id() frees both the cm_id and the struct rdma_id_private. Make sure that cm_work_handler() does not trigger a use-after-free by only freeing of the struct rdma_id_private after all pending work has finished. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42294 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-19 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: fix deadlock between sd_remove & sd_release Our test report the following hung task: [ 2538.459400] INFO: task "kworker/0:0":7 blocked for more than 188 seconds. [ 2538.459427] Call trace: [ 2538.459430] __switch_to+0x174/0x338 [ 2538.459436] __schedule+0x628/0x9c4 [ 2538.459442] schedule+0x7c/0xe8 [ 2538.459447] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x24/0x40 [ 2538.459453] __mutex_lock+0x3ec/0xf04 [ 2538.459456] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x14/0x24 [ 2538.459459] mutex_lock+0x30/0xd8 [ 2538.459462] del_gendisk+0xdc/0x350 [ 2538.459466] sd_remove+0x30/0x60 [ 2538.459470] device_release_driver_internal+0x1c4/0x2c4 [ 2538.459474] device_release_driver+0x18/0x28 [ 2538.459478] bus_remove_device+0x15c/0x174 [ 2538.459483] device_del+0x1d0/0x358 [ 2538.459488] __scsi_remove_device+0xa8/0x198 [ 2538.459493] scsi_forget_host+0x50/0x70 [ 2538.459497] scsi_remove_host+0x80/0x180 [ 2538.459502] usb_stor_disconnect+0x68/0xf4 [ 2538.459506] usb_unbind_interface+0xd4/0x280 [ 2538.459510] device_release_driver_internal+0x1c4/0x2c4 [ 2538.459514] device_release_driver+0x18/0x28 [ 2538.459518] bus_remove_device+0x15c/0x174 [ 2538.459523] device_del+0x1d0/0x358 [ 2538.459528] usb_disable_device+0x84/0x194 [ 2538.459532] usb_disconnect+0xec/0x300 [ 2538.459537] hub_event+0xb80/0x1870 [ 2538.459541] process_scheduled_works+0x248/0x4dc [ 2538.459545] worker_thread+0x244/0x334 [ 2538.459549] kthread+0x114/0x1bc [ 2538.461001] INFO: task "fsck.":15415 blocked for more than 188 seconds. [ 2538.461014] Call trace: [ 2538.461016] __switch_to+0x174/0x338 [ 2538.461021] __schedule+0x628/0x9c4 [ 2538.461025] schedule+0x7c/0xe8 [ 2538.461030] blk_queue_enter+0xc4/0x160 [ 2538.461034] blk_mq_alloc_request+0x120/0x1d4 [ 2538.461037] scsi_execute_cmd+0x7c/0x23c [ 2538.461040] ioctl_internal_command+0x5c/0x164 [ 2538.461046] scsi_set_medium_removal+0x5c/0xb0 [ 2538.461051] sd_release+0x50/0x94 [ 2538.461054] blkdev_put+0x190/0x28c [ 2538.461058] blkdev_release+0x28/0x40 [ 2538.461063] __fput+0xf8/0x2a8 [ 2538.461066] __fput_sync+0x28/0x5c [ 2538.461070] __arm64_sys_close+0x84/0xe8 [ 2538.461073] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x114 [ 2538.461078] el0_svc_common+0xac/0xe0 [ 2538.461082] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 2538.461087] el0_svc+0x38/0x68 [ 2538.461090] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xbc [ 2538.461093] el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac T1: T2: sd_remove del_gendisk __blk_mark_disk_dead blk_freeze_queue_start ++q->mq_freeze_depth bdev_release mutex_lock(&disk->open_mutex) sd_release scsi_execute_cmd blk_queue_enter wait_event(!q->mq_freeze_depth) mutex_lock(&disk->open_mutex) SCSI does not set GD_OWNS_QUEUE, so QUEUE_FLAG_DYING is not set in this scenario. This is a classic ABBA deadlock. To fix the deadlock, make sure we don't try to acquire disk->open_mutex after freezing the queue. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42258 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-14 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: huge_memory: use !CONFIG_64BIT to relax huge page alignment on 32 bit machines Yves-Alexis Perez reported commit 4ef9ad19e176 ("mm: huge_memory: don't force huge page alignment on 32 bit") didn't work for x86_32 [1]. It is because x86_32 uses CONFIG_X86_32 instead of CONFIG_32BIT. !CONFIG_64BIT should cover all 32 bit machines. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAHbLzkr1LwH3pcTgM+aGQ31ip2bKqiqEQ8=FQB+t2c3dhNKNHA@mail.gmail.com/ | |||||
| CVE-2024-42248 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: serial: ma35d1: Add a NULL check for of_node The pdev->dev.of_node can be NULL if the "serial" node is absent. Add a NULL check to return an error in such cases. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42249 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 3.3 LOW |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: don't unoptimize message in spi_async() Calling spi_maybe_unoptimize_message() in spi_async() is wrong because the message is likely to be in the queue and not transferred yet. This can corrupt the message while it is being used by the controller driver. spi_maybe_unoptimize_message() is already called in the correct place in spi_finalize_current_message() to balance the call to spi_maybe_optimize_message() in spi_async(). | |||||
| CVE-2024-42250 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: add missing lock protection when polling Add missing lock protection in poll routine when iterating xarray, otherwise: Even with RCU read lock held, only the slot of the radix tree is ensured to be pinned there, while the data structure (e.g. struct cachefiles_req) stored in the slot has no such guarantee. The poll routine will iterate the radix tree and dereference cachefiles_req accordingly. Thus RCU read lock is not adequate in this case and spinlock is needed here. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42232 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: fix race between delayed_work() and ceph_monc_stop() The way the delayed work is handled in ceph_monc_stop() is prone to races with mon_fault() and possibly also finish_hunting(). Both of these can requeue the delayed work which wouldn't be canceled by any of the following code in case that happens after cancel_delayed_work_sync() runs -- __close_session() doesn't mess with the delayed work in order to avoid interfering with the hunting interval logic. This part was missed in commit b5d91704f53e ("libceph: behave in mon_fault() if cur_mon < 0") and use-after-free can still ensue on monc and objects that hang off of it, with monc->auth and monc->monmap being particularly susceptible to quickly being reused. To fix this: - clear monc->cur_mon and monc->hunting as part of closing the session in ceph_monc_stop() - bail from delayed_work() if monc->cur_mon is cleared, similar to how it's done in mon_fault() and finish_hunting() (based on monc->hunting) - call cancel_delayed_work_sync() after the session is closed | |||||
| CVE-2024-42233 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 3.3 LOW |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: filemap: replace pte_offset_map() with pte_offset_map_nolock() The vmf->ptl in filemap_fault_recheck_pte_none() is still set from handle_pte_fault(). But at the same time, we did a pte_unmap(vmf->pte). After a pte_unmap(vmf->pte) unmap and rcu_read_unlock(), the page table may be racily changed and vmf->ptl maybe fails to protect the actual page table. Fix this by replacing pte_offset_map() with pte_offset_map_nolock(). As David said, the PTL pointer might be stale so if we continue to use it infilemap_fault_recheck_pte_none(), it might trigger UAF. Also, if the PTL fails, the issue fixed by commit 58f327f2ce80 ("filemap: avoid unnecessary major faults in filemap_fault()") might reappear. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42234 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: fix crashes from deferred split racing folio migration Even on 6.10-rc6, I've been seeing elusive "Bad page state"s (often on flags when freeing, yet the flags shown are not bad: PG_locked had been set and cleared??), and VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0)s from deferred_split_scan()'s folio_put(), and a variety of other BUG and WARN symptoms implying double free by deferred split and large folio migration. 6.7 commit 9bcef5973e31 ("mm: memcg: fix split queue list crash when large folio migration") was right to fix the memcg-dependent locking broken in 85ce2c517ade ("memcontrol: only transfer the memcg data for migration"), but missed a subtlety of deferred_split_scan(): it moves folios to its own local list to work on them without split_queue_lock, during which time folio->_deferred_list is not empty, but even the "right" lock does nothing to secure the folio and the list it is on. Fortunately, deferred_split_scan() is careful to use folio_try_get(): so folio_migrate_mapping() can avoid the race by folio_undo_large_rmappable() while the old folio's reference count is temporarily frozen to 0 - adding such a freeze in the !mapping case too (originally, folio lock and unmapping and no swap cache left an anon folio unreachable, so no freezing was needed there: but the deferred split queue offers a way to reach it). | |||||
| CVE-2024-42235 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/mm: Add NULL pointer check to crst_table_free() base_crst_free() crst_table_free() used to work with NULL pointers before the conversion to ptdescs. Since crst_table_free() can be called with a NULL pointer (error handling in crst_table_upgrade() add an explicit check. Also add the same check to base_crst_free() for consistency reasons. In real life this should not happen, since order two GFP_KERNEL allocations will not fail, unless FAIL_PAGE_ALLOC is enabled and used. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42238 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: cs_dsp: Return error if block header overflows file Return an error from cs_dsp_power_up() if a block header is longer than the amount of data left in the file. The previous code in cs_dsp_load() and cs_dsp_load_coeff() would loop while there was enough data left in the file for a valid region. This protected against overrunning the end of the file data, but it didn't abort the file processing with an error. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42236 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: configfs: Prevent OOB read/write in usb_string_copy() Userspace provided string 's' could trivially have the length zero. Left unchecked this will firstly result in an OOB read in the form `if (str[0 - 1] == '\n') followed closely by an OOB write in the form `str[0 - 1] = '\0'`. There is already a validating check to catch strings that are too long. Let's supply an additional check for invalid strings that are too short. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42237 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: cs_dsp: Validate payload length before processing block Move the payload length check in cs_dsp_load() and cs_dsp_coeff_load() to be done before the block is processed. The check that the length of a block payload does not exceed the number of remaining bytes in the firwmware file buffer was being done near the end of the loop iteration. However, some code before that check used the length field without validating it. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42239 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fail bpf_timer_cancel when callback is being cancelled Given a schedule: timer1 cb timer2 cb bpf_timer_cancel(timer2); bpf_timer_cancel(timer1); Both bpf_timer_cancel calls would wait for the other callback to finish executing, introducing a lockup. Add an atomic_t count named 'cancelling' in bpf_hrtimer. This keeps track of all in-flight cancellation requests for a given BPF timer. Whenever cancelling a BPF timer, we must check if we have outstanding cancellation requests, and if so, we must fail the operation with an error (-EDEADLK) since cancellation is synchronous and waits for the callback to finish executing. This implies that we can enter a deadlock situation involving two or more timer callbacks executing in parallel and attempting to cancel one another. Note that we avoid incrementing the cancelling counter for the target timer (the one being cancelled) if bpf_timer_cancel is not invoked from a callback, to avoid spurious errors. The whole point of detecting cur->cancelling and returning -EDEADLK is to not enter a busy wait loop (which may or may not lead to a lockup). This does not apply in case the caller is in a non-callback context, the other side can continue to cancel as it sees fit without running into errors. Background on prior attempts: Earlier versions of this patch used a bool 'cancelling' bit and used the following pattern under timer->lock to publish cancellation status. lock(t->lock); t->cancelling = true; mb(); if (cur->cancelling) return -EDEADLK; unlock(t->lock); hrtimer_cancel(t->timer); t->cancelling = false; The store outside the critical section could overwrite a parallel requests t->cancelling assignment to true, to ensure the parallely executing callback observes its cancellation status. It would be necessary to clear this cancelling bit once hrtimer_cancel is done, but lack of serialization introduced races. Another option was explored where bpf_timer_start would clear the bit when (re)starting the timer under timer->lock. This would ensure serialized access to the cancelling bit, but may allow it to be cleared before in-flight hrtimer_cancel has finished executing, such that lockups can occur again. Thus, we choose an atomic counter to keep track of all outstanding cancellation requests and use it to prevent lockups in case callbacks attempt to cancel each other while executing in parallel. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42240 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2024-08-08 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/bhi: Avoid warning in #DB handler due to BHI mitigation When BHI mitigation is enabled, if SYSENTER is invoked with the TF flag set then entry_SYSENTER_compat() uses CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY and calls the clear_bhb_loop() before the TF flag is cleared. This causes the #DB handler (exc_debug_kernel()) to issue a warning because single-step is used outside the entry_SYSENTER_compat() function. To address this issue, entry_SYSENTER_compat() should use CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY after making sure the TF flag is cleared. The problem can be reproduced with the following sequence: $ cat sysenter_step.c int main() { asm("pushf; pop %ax; bts $8,%ax; push %ax; popf; sysenter"); } $ gcc -o sysenter_step sysenter_step.c $ ./sysenter_step Segmentation fault (core dumped) The program is expected to crash, and the #DB handler will issue a warning. Kernel log: WARNING: CPU: 27 PID: 7000 at arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1009 exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160 ... RIP: 0010:exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160 ... Call Trace: <#DB> ? show_regs+0x68/0x80 ? __warn+0x8c/0x140 ? exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160 ? report_bug+0x175/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x44/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1c/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 ? exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160 exc_debug+0x43/0x50 asm_exc_debug+0x1e/0x40 RIP: 0010:clear_bhb_loop+0x0/0xb0 ... </#DB> <TASK> ? entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x8d </TASK> [ bp: Massage commit message. ] | |||||