Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement
Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS).
CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented
Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data
and return addresses are accompanied by so called "shadow stacks",
holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren't
writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their
contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address
coming from the traditional stack.
In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In
various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of
the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then
invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an
exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly.
Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn't right:
Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack.
The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
26 Apr 2025, 20:15
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13 Feb 2025, 18:15
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Summary | (en) Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data and return addresses are accompanied by so called "shadow stacks", holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren't writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address coming from the traditional stack. In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly. Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn't right: Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack. The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing. |
21 Nov 2024, 08:29
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References | () https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZON4TLXG7TG4A2XZG563JMVTGQW4SF3A/ - | |
References | () https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-451.html - |
05 Nov 2024, 19:35
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CVSS |
v2 : v3 : |
v2 : unknown
v3 : 6.5 |
Summary |
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23 Mar 2024, 03:15
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References |
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20 Mar 2024, 13:00
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New CVE |
Information
Published : 2024-03-20 11:15
Updated : 2025-04-26 20:15
NVD link : CVE-2023-46841
Mitre link : CVE-2023-46841
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2023-46841
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
No CWE.